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The consequences of the 2008 crisis
on Britain’s Inflation Targeting
Framework
Les conséquences de la crise de 2008 sur le cadre britannique de ciblage de
l’inflation
Nathalie Champroux
1 The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 in both the United States and the
United Kingdom represents a turning point in the economic history of most developed
countries. It tipped the Western world into economic turmoil, thus wiping out several
decades  of  economic  stability,  and called  into  question  many of  the  macroeconomic
theories that had developed over these decades. In the United Kingdom, the systemic
financial  crisis  that  rolled out  proved “unprecedented in  scale1”  and the subsequent
recession lasted four quarters in a row over 2008-2009. Yet, the British authorities had
reacted strongly, as soon as the signs of economic dysfunctioning had been recognized.
2 Among all the measures that the British authorities enforced, this article examines the
monetary policy response to the crisis.  In particular,  it seeks to understand whether,
beyond  the  activation  of  unconventional  practices,  the  crisis  caused  a  major
restructuring of  the  United Kingdom’s  monetary  policy  framework.  The first  section
briefly recalls what British monetary policy consisted in before the crisis. The second and
third sections show how New Labour, and then the coalition Government, responded to
the 2008 crisis and its aftermath within the framework. The fourth section determines
how the reform of monetary policy of 2013 altered the fundamentals of the framework
and the  fifth  section  places  the  reform in  the  context  of  the  progress  of  monetary
theories.
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Britain’s Inflation Targeting before the Crisis
3 Since  October  1992,  British  monetary  policy  has  officially  been  dedicated  to  price
stability, through a framework of inflation targeting (IT) that was first improvised by the
Conservative  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Norman  Lamont.  The  framework  was
strengthened  five  years  later  by  New Labour’s  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Gordon
Brown, especially through the adoption of the Bank of England Act 1998.
4 Regarding monetary policy2, the law confirmed that the objectives of the Bank of England
were “(a) to maintain price stability and (b) subject to that, to support the economic
policy  of  Her  Majesty’s  Government,  including  its  objectives  for  growth  and
employment.” To realize these objectives, the Bank would comprise a new entity of nine
members,  a  Monetary  Policy  Committee  (MPC),  enjoying  complete  operational
independence in “formulating monetary policy” (i.e. setting the level of interest rates).
The law also said that the Treasury would specify annually to the Governor of the Bank of
England, “(a) what price stability is to be taken to consist of, or (b) what the economic
policy of Her Majesty’s Government is to be taken to be.”
5 The law also reinforced transparency and accountability, with an obligation to publish a
statement  each  time  the  decision  of  an  intervention  was  made,  the  minutes  of  the
meetings and monthly reports, and with the surveillance of the MPC’s procedures by a
Parliamentary “Oversight Committee”. A last section dealt with the Treasury’s “reserve
powers”, that is to say the right to dictate operational actions to the Bank in “extreme
economic circumstances”, with the prior approval of Parliament3.
6 In  his  new  monetary  policy  framework,  Brown  refreshed  the  target  for  inflation,
replacing the target range by a symmetrical point. More importantly, the 1998 Budget
also specified that even though the target was valid “at all times”, temporary deviations
could occur. As a means of information and accountability, the obligation was introduced
for the Governor to send an open letter to the Chancellor, should inflation be more than
one percentage point  higher or lower than the target.  The letter  should explain the
situation and the MPC’s plan to reverse it4, which sounded much like a provision already
made in 1992 by Lamont5.
7 The framework then remained unchanged for five years.  On 10 December 20036,  two
changes were introduced. First, the Chancellor announced the inflation target was now
based on an internationally  recognised measure,  the Harmonised Index of  Consumer
Prices (HICP, renamed Consumer Prices Index or CPI), instead of the RPIX. The change
induced the setting of a new target value, at 2%. Second, it was the start of the publication
of  the  Chancellor’s  remit  for  the  MPC.  Since  then,  the  remits,  and  the  letters  that
introduce them, have been the reference documents fixing the rules of the monetary
policy framework.
8 Ten years later, the assessment of the IT framework displayed gratifying results. Since
the inception of IT at the end of 1992, until the improvement of the framework in 1997,
average inflation as measured by RPIX was only 2.7%. It decreased again down to 2.5%
from 1998 to 20057. As measured by CPI, inflation was 1.5% on average between 1997 and
20078. Over this last period, the actual inflation rate never deviated by more than one
percentage point from the targets. The truth is inflation had already been decelerating
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even before the beginning of IT in 1992. But since then, stability had been remarkable,
both in terms of inflation and GDP growth, hence the reference to the nice decade9.
9 The stability was probably enhanced by other factors than monetary policy only. At the
beginning of 2007, a study made by the Bank of England’s experts reckoned there were
domestic but non-monetary factors too, like the supportive fiscal framework, and also
other  external  factors,  due  to  the  integration  into  the  world  economy  of  emerging
countries and to immigration10. Yet, the experts demonstrated the effectiveness of the IT
framework and institutional arrangements. This effectiveness was put into question by
the 2008 crisis.
 
The Monetary Responses to the 2008 Crisis under
New Labour
10 British Governments and the Bank of England took numerous actions of a massive scale to
pull the United Kingdom out of the financial crisis and subsequent recession. In the flow
of  interventions,  it  was  rather  difficult  to  distinguish clearly  between monetary and
financial (or banking sector) actions. It is therefore necessary to recall official definitions
to avoid confusion. The Bank of England only lists under the appellation of “monetary
policy operations” the setting of the Bank Rate, the injection of money directly into the
economy by purchasing financial assets (Quantitative Easing) and Forward Guidance11.
The  Treasury  confirms,  by  not  inventorying  any  of  the  former  as  a  financial  policy
intervention.  It  also  considers  the  Asset  Purchase  Facility  established in  2009 as  the
concrete means to finance the Quantitative Easing programs12.
11 The  first  monetary  actions  that  were  taken  were  the  cuts  in  the  Bank  Rate,  which
commenced in December 2007 and ended in March 200913, under the leaderships of
Gordon Brown as Prime Minister and Alistair Darling as Chancellor. The first wave of cuts
occurred from December 2007 to April 2008 and reduced the Bank Rate down to 5.0%. The
MPC  justified  the  cuts  by  the  risk  of  too  low  inflation  in  the  medium  term  that
accompanied the prevision of a sharp slowdown in economic activity14. The Committee
proved right: Inflation was actually below 2% between June and November 2009, hitting a
low of 1.09% in September15. The second wave of cuts occurred between October 2008 and
March 2009 and brought the Bank Rate down to 0.5%. The first reduction was part of one
of the rare international concerted actions in response to the unexpectedly massive scale
of the economic crisis16. Yet, the MPC justified it, and all the others that it decided, by the
need to compensate for the risk of inflation undershooting the 2% target in the medium
term. Among the risk factors, the Committee identified the domestic recession, which
increased spare capacity and pushed wages and companies’ margins down, and the fall in
energy and food prices17.
12 All the interest rate cuts, which responded to the crisis situation, remained within New
Labour’s monetary policy framework. First, the Government did not use its reserve power
to dictate the interest rate levels or the timing of change. Not only did the Chancellor let
the MPC’s experts do their job,  he also always endorsed the Committee’s operational
decisions, whatever the situation. At each target overshooting, for example, he publicly
expressed his agreement with the MPC’s justifications and forward-looking decisions18.
Second,  officially,  the ultimate objective of  monetary policy never stopped being the
control of inflation. Helping with output was presented as a means to reach this objective,
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not the contrary. As a result, the remits did not encounter any modifications under New
Labour. Only the Chancellor’s accompanying letters varied slightly, with the mention of
the emergence of global challenges and some references to the Asset Purchase Facility.
13 The Asset Purchase Facility (APF), launched on 29 January 2009, is an arrangement under
which the Bank of England is authorized to purchase high-quality assets from the private
sector,  the list  of  which is  validated by the Treasury.  In March 2009,  the Chancellor
permitted the MPC to use the APF as a monetary policy instrument, with the financing of
asset  purchases  through the central  bank’s  creation of  money.  This  way of  injecting
money directly into the economy is known as Quantitative Easing (QE). There were four
waves of purchasing government bonds (gilts), but also commercial paper and corporate
bonds, from March to November 2009, for a total of £200 billion. In January 2010, the
Bank  of  England  then  started  selling  as  well  as  purchasing  corporate  bonds  in  the
secondary market. And in February, the Treasury allowed the Bank to continue to do so,
but required the future purchases to be financed by the issuance of Treasury bills.
14 Just like the manipulation of interest rates, QE was implemented within New Labour’s
monetary framework and dedicated to IT. It was conceived as an alternative to the Bank
Rate instrument, which could not be reduced further, whereas the urgency to support the
recovery in nominal spending persisted. In the minutes of the meeting held in February
2009, which set the case for the use of APF for monetary purposes, the MPC repeated no
less than four times that the unique motive was to meet the 2% inflation target, and
insisted on the importance of  diffusing this  message when communicating about the
MPC’s actions19. In his letter dated 3 March 2009, which officially authorized QE, Darling
therefore confirmed the Committee’s objective of price stability20. In his following letters,
“price  stability”  was  simply  replaced  by  “monetary  stability21”.  Since  QE  operations,
financed by the APF, were just seen as a supplementary monetary instrument, on the
same level as the Bank Rate, the MPC was accountable for any of its decision regarding
this new instrument, through the existing system of publication of Inflation Reports and
evidence to the Treasury Committee.
15 Even if the exact effects of the Bank Rate cuts and the QE programmes on the United
Kingdom’s economy cannot be accurately assessed, because all other things are never
equal, all analysts agree the interest rate cuts were the thing to do and the crisis would
have been deeper without QE22. Yet, at the beginning of 2010, with GDP growth still lower
than 0.5%23 and inflation back to above 3%, the British population had no reasons to
rejoice. In its discontent, the electorate voted against New Labour on 6 May 2010.
 
The Conservatives’ Extension of Existing Responses
16 The  new coalition  Government,  led  by  Conservative  Prime  Minister  David  Cameron,
assisted  by  Liberal-Democrat  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Nick  Clegg,  and  Conservative
Chancellor George Osborne took over a context of high inflation. This context lingered for
more than two years, while growth showed no signs of recovery. During this period, the
Government reinforced the measures implemented by its predecessors.
17 Osborne affirmed the new Government’s commitment to maintaining price stability and
pursuing the 2% inflation target just after arrival in power24, and confirmed the target in
each remit for the MPC that he sent from March 2011. It should be noted that his first
remit, which was faithfully replicated afterwards until 2013, showed few modifications
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from Darling’s remits. Furthermore, these modifications were only related to the new
Government’s beliefs and objectives, but not to monetary policy itself25.
18 Concerning the MPC’s monetary policy operations themselves, while inflation accelerated
throughout 2010 and 2011, Osborne accepted the Committee’s decisions to keep the Bank
Rate close to the zero lower bound. In addition, he allowed for the rise in the amount of
the APF available for QE interventions, up to £375 billion by July 2012. As a matter of fact,
the new independent economic analysis institution, the Office for Budget Responsibility,
that the Conservatives had created, always validated the MPC’s inflation previsions in the
medium and longer-term. These previsions were that inflation would eventually return to
the 2% target in the medium term, with a substantial risk of undershooting because the
economy was still struggling.
19 Indeed, the steady recovery experienced after the deep trough of the last quarter of 2008
suddenly came to a halt in the second quarter of 2010. Until the first quarter of 2013, GDP
growth was very  volatile,  sometimes  negative,  and never  as  high as  1%26.  So  it  was
certainly not the right time to prevent the MPC from practicing monetary ease. Actually,
monetary ease – or “monetary activism” – was the counterpart to fiscal austerity in what
the Chancellor later labelled the Government’s “economic strategy27”. Yet, the strategy
was  not  presented  as  such.  Rather,  Osborne  claimed  that  the  commitment  of  the
Government to reduce the budget deficit created a fiscal credibility supportive of the
recovery, and of price stability and so, in turn, allowed monetary policy to be loosened so
as to stimulate the economy28.
20 There was nevertheless a limit beyond which monetary policy could not be loosened
further without risking to fuel inflation and disrupt the financial market structure too
much for a smooth return to normal monetary policy in due course. Even though from
November 2012 some MPC members started voting in favour of raising the APF to £400
billion,  most  members  argued  against  the  measure  and  voted  accordingly29.  The
disturbing  disagreement  went  on  even  after  Governor  King  had  been  succeeded  by
Carney in July 2013. But in the meantime, the coalition Government had asked the MPC to
examine the opportunity of implementing other monetary instruments. In August, the
Committee opted for Forward Guidance, in the wake of several central banks30.
 
The Next Phase: The 2013 Monetary Policy Reform
21 Forward Guidance (FWG) is a form of communication dedicated to managing the market
participants’ comportments by influencing their expectations of future monetary policy.
In the United Kingdom, the MPC first proceeded in August 2013 by adopting a proposal
stating its intention “not to raise Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% at least until [...]
the unemployment rate [had] fallen to a threshold of 7%31”. As the unemployment rate
approached  the  threshold,  the  message  was  reviewed  in  February  2014.  The  MPC
announced it would “seek to close the spare capacity in the economy over the next two to
three years while keeping inflation close to the target32”. Spare capacity was evaluated at
broadly 1%–1.5% of GDP, but the pace at which it would be absorbed remained unclear33.
What  the  markets  had  to  expect,  though,  was  that  there  were  no  Bank  Rate  rises
scheduled as long as the spare capacity persisted, which could take years. And when these
rises eventually came, they would be very fragmented and small. Apparently, this second
form of  FWG worked,  because  the  statistics  show that  since  2013,  the  markets  have
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resumed their cuts in most of the interest rates they offer to households and businesses,
and so have supported consumption and investment34.
22 The MPC did not decide on its own to have recourse to FWG. The Chancellor, assisted by
Chief Economic Adviser Rupert Harrison, was the instigator of the move which was part
of a far broader plan designed to put the United Kingdom’s economy back on track. The
plan was revealed in the 2013 Budget and comprised four pillars.  The first pillar was
entitled “Monetary activism35” and included two sections, one about “Monetary policy”
and the other about “Credit easing”. The first section presented the updated remit that
Osborne was sending to the MPC36 and that he assimilated to a monetary “reform” in his
Budget statement.
23 In 2013, the move to the use of unconventional policy instruments, and especially FWG,
attracted  much  media  attention  for  various  reasons.  First,  in  his  Budget  statement,
Osborne chose to elaborate on FWG. He went so far as to quote the option of intermediate
thresholds and the example of the Fed which was using the unemployment rate37. He thus
gave the media plenty to speculate about. Second, the newly appointed Governor, 47-
year-old and charismatic Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and Chairman of the
Financial  Stability  Board of  the  G20,  was  frequently  put  in  the spotlight  and always
associated to his role in the use of  unconventional monetary instruments in Canada.
Third, the MPC’s announcement of the use of the 7% unemployment threshold was the
most concrete and visible outcome of the strategy.
24 Yet,  FWG should  not  be  regarded as  the  main feature of  Osborne’s  monetary  policy
reform.  By  2014,  in  the  section  of  the  remit  dedicated  to  “Unconventional  policy
instruments”, the Chancellor reduced his advocacy to the mere statement that the use of
FWG was left to the discretion of the MPC. Any reference to the “thresholds”, which had
been written no less  than three times in the updated remit  of  2013,  was erased.  By
contrast, what remained was the more general requirement of the creation of a solid
governance and accountability system when unconventional  interventions may affect
credit  risk  or  credit  allocation.  To  illustrate  this  point,  the  Chancellor  retained  the
examples of the APF and the FLS. So in the end, what the reform permanently brought in
the area of unconventional policy instruments was a clarification of when they could be
used and what governance change should accompany their implementation.
25 The monetary policy reform concerned two other areas. One was the flexibility of the
framework and the second was the relationship between monetary stability and financial
stability. As a matter of fact, these two areas were closely intertwined in the reform. First,
the  updated  remit  went  further  than  the  traditional  acceptance  of  inflation  target
overshoots  or  undershoots  due  to  exceptional  shocks  and  disturbances.  The  reform
actually acknowledged the responsibility of the MPC in the potential deviations, by saying
that the Committee may “wish” to allow deviations. Then, two circumstances for these
voluntary  deviations  were  identified.  The  first  was  the  consideration  of  “short-term
trade-offs”  between the need to return inflation to the target  and the risk to  cause
undesirable  volatility  in output.  The remit  went  on with the specific  claim for  clear
explanations  from  the  MPC  about  how  the  trade-offs influenced  the  Committee’s
previsions and decisions. The second circumstance, though not exactly expressed in these
terms, can be summed up by the consideration of trade-offs between the need to return
inflation to the target and the risk to contribute to financial instability. The monetary
reform stipulated that the MPC and the Financial Policy Committee should “have regard”
to  the  policy  actions  of  the  other.  Consequently,  a  last  section  added  to  the  remit
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announced overlap in membership of  the two Committees,  and required each of  the
institutions  to  include,  inside  their  various  accountability  publications,  explanations
about how they had regard to the other’s actions.
26 In the end, the reform38 was not the total overhaul of monetary policy that was pressed by
commentators and pressure groups like Positive Money, but that the Treasury’s thorough
preparatory work had discarded. The preparation had taken the form of a review of no
fewer than 62 pages, along which the Treasury had examined the performance of the
British monetary policy framework and explored alternatives in the light of evolving
monetary policies around the world. The option of an exchange of the CPI for another
measure of inflation (like core inflation, nominal wage inflation and asset price inflation)
had been analysed and rejected. So had the hypothesis of abandoning IT altogether for
the alternatives of price level targeting, nominal GDP growth targeting or nominal GDP
level  targeting.  In  the  end,  the  Treasury had concluded that  the  existing flexible  IT
framework had served the United Kingdom well and should be maintained39. This came as
a disappointment for some who had hoped a lot more with Carney’s appointment as
Governor of the Bank of England.
27 As a foreigner,  Carney was largely unknown by the British lay public,  but he rapidly
became the object of the press scrutiny. His general remark on the potential necessity, in
extraordinary circumstances, to relinquish the IT framework in favour of a targeting of a
nominal  GDP  level40 did  not  go  unnoticed.  That  was  what  the  self-called  Market
Monetarists, led by Danish economist Lars Christensen, had been recommending for some
time41. There were proponents of nominal GDP targeting in the United Kingdom too, and
they were sometimes quite insistent,  like the Financial  Times’s economic commentator
Samuel Brittan42. So suddenly there were widespread speculation and arguments about
whether Osborne would make the leap. But eventually, the Treasury concurred with the
more conservative opinion of  outgoing Governor King who strongly defended the IT
framework43. Therefore, British monetary policy is still subordinated to the priority to
keep inflation low and stable in the long term, as defined by the target of 2% inflation in
the medium term.
 
The 2013 Reform in the Dynamic of Monetary
Theories
28 The  2013  monetary  policy  reform  should  be  valued  for  the  fact  that  it  brought
clarification  in  the  Government’s  position  regarding  two  ongoing  monetary  policy
debates, the first of which is the “rule versus discretion” debate. This debate opposes the
value of a policy constrained by the strict respect of rules (such as the reduction of money
supply aggregates to planned quantitative levels, or the stability of exchange rates at
fixed levels in a monetary system), to that of a policy left to the entire discretion of the
monetary authorities44. According to economists Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, rules
guarantee  the  time-consistency  of  a  policy,  that  is  to  say  long-term  outcomes  that
correspond to the policy objective45. But discretion permits the authorities to adapt their
response to destabilising events in order to smooth the effects they may produce.
29 In a now widely-quoted article, Ben Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin identified IT as a
framework reconciling rule with discretion. The economists argued that, in practice, IT
was not a strict rule, but a framework ensuring “constrained discretion”: The central
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banks actually dealt with short term issues like output and employment provided that did
not affect their meeting of the long-term objective of stable inflation46. At the Bank of
England, King did not think differently. When still Deputy Governor in 1997, he presented
IT  as  a  framework  guaranteeing  that  central  banks  were  not  left  with  “unfettered
discretion47”. Like Bernanke and Mishkin, he insisted on the fact that monetary policy
had two components: an inflation target and a response to shocks. He explained that
faced with a supply shock, the central banks were confronted with a trade-off between
the volatility of  inflation and the volatility of  output,  and their role was to properly
choose which time horizon was the best to return inflation to target without too much
damage on output. Adding to the works of John Taylor48, King stated that the optimal
targeting horizon depended on the nature and persistence of shocks. For many supply
shocks a two year horizon was reasonable. But when shocks were larger, there might be a
need to extend this horizon. The goal of the Governor’s open letter, when the inflation
target was missed, was to inform on this extension.
30 In light of King’s discourse, it is obvious that the remit updated in 2013 simply officialised
a situation that already existed regarding the dual component of monetary policy and the
extent of  the discretionary powers of the Bank of England.  So in practice,  there was
nothing new. But the message had obviously not been understood previously. Indeed, the
remits published before 2013 had been short on developments and explanations about
discretion. That deficiency was of no consequence as long as there were no major crises.
But since 2008, there was a growing need to complement the message, to explain why the
MPC  seemed  gradually  more  focused  on  output  than  on  inflation.  Indeed,  inflation
deviations from target went on occurring without causing much official stir. At the same
time, the emergence of operations concerted with the Government, like the FLS, gave the
impression  that  the  Bank  of  England  was  more  and  more  required  to  support  the
Government’s  objective  for  growth,  rather  than  to  maintain  price  stability.  The
misunderstanding  of  the  true  mechanism  of  monetary  policy  action  added  to  the
confusion of the markets and needed to be cleared up. As it turned out, the Government’s
clarification  about  the  trade-off  between  inflation  and  output  volatility  was  often
interpreted as a step towards more discretion.
31 In reality,  the main move towards more discretion was rather the positioning of the
coalition Government in a second debate called the “lean versus clean” debate. In this
debate,  the question is  to decide whether monetary policy has a  role to play in the
prevention of  asset price bubbles (leaning against the wind) or should only focus on
restoring the macroeconomic situation back to normal if  bubbles burst  (cleaning the
mess)49.  This  debate  had  long  existed.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  “clean”  side  had
arguably won the argument, with the definition of monetary policy written in the Bank of
England Act 1998, even if some research revealed the MPC had actually responded to
financial market volatility50.  But the debate had naturally reopened with the financial
crisis and its economic aftermath. At the Bank of England, outgoing Governor King was of
the unshakable opinion that central banks should not use the Bank Rate for financial
stability objectives51. But incoming Governor Carney was fuelling the debate. He believed
that even if the prevention of financial bubbles was first a matter of micro- and macro-
prudential regulation and supervision, there might be a point at which monetary policy
would  be  the  last  line  of  defence52.  Eventually,  the  coalition  Government  found  a
consensus. Osborne did not modify the objective of monetary policy by giving the MPC
the  role  of  ensuring  financial  stability.  Rather,  another  committee,  the  FPC,  was
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(re)created to deal with the latter objective. Nevertheless, the monetary policy reform of
2013 actually managed to link the two intertwined objectives of monetary and financial
stability53.
32 The reform of the British monetary policy framework was embedded in the context of the
progress of monetary theories in the light of a situation that was encountered worldwide
for the first  time.  IT frameworks had never been confronted with such a large scale
financial crisis. As for the hypothesis of the Bank Rates stuck at the zero lower bound, it
had always been a “theoretical curiosity54”. In the end, the IT frameworks stood the test
and  their  flexibility  provided  adequate  responses,  but  the  crisis  had  raised  many
interrogations in the fields of  economic analysis  in general55 and monetary policy in
particular. When economists did not ask for a scrap of IT altogether, they proposed the
kinds  of  improvement  that  the  British  coalition  Government  adopted56.  Indeed,  a
worldwide recurring recommendation was that of spreading the use of FWG, with a clear
statement about future policy intentions linked to specific economic conditions, whether
these conditions were still anomalous or back to normal. Another repeated instruction
was that of keeping monetary policy as a last line of defence, but securing coordination
between monetary  and macro-prudential  policies57.  A  thorough comparison with  the
evolution of the IT frameworks in the major economies would allow for a better measure
of global influences.
33 Yet, the coalition Government should not be detracted from the paternity of its reform.
The monetary policy reform may even appear as a truly Conservative move, and not only
because it respected the principles set by John Major’s Government as of 1992. Indeed, it
was an echo of the vision the Conservatives had of monetary policy when arriving in
power in 1979, which was that of “monetary activism”. The first Thatcher Government
had heavily relied on the Medium Term Financial Strategy to create the optimal stability
conditions for economic growth, while trying on the other hand to cure the budget from
its deficit and from debt evils58. In 2013, Cameron was strongly backing his Chancellor’s
strategy of fiscal conservatism combined with monetary activism59.  In both cases,  the
Governments had the same discourse: They said monetary stability was a pre-condition,
but was not sufficient to ensure economic growth and employment. And in both cases,
they seemed to put too much faith in the potency of monetary policy to restore growth.
Furthermore,  a  rather  Conservative  approach  may  be  recognized  in  the  hands-on
behaviour of Osborne regarding monetary policy. Even though the Government did not
attempt to repeal the monetary policy sections of the Bank of England Act 1998 that
ensured the operational independence of the MPC, the Chancellor went as far as he could
to intervene in the MPC’s work within the legal constraint.
 
Conclusion
34 The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession forced emergency measures.
Next, they called into question the validity of the existing monetary framework dedicated
to  price  stability.  The  framework  was  thus  revised  as  of  2013.  First,  the  use  of
unconventional instruments by the Bank of England was officially authorised and the
terms of the regulation of such a use were reaffirmed. Second, the scope of the discretion
allocated to the Bank in the consideration of the trade-off between inflation volatility and
output  volatility  was  clarified.  Third,  supplementary  discretion  was  granted  in  the
context of more coordination between monetary and financial policies.
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35 Yet, in light of the impressive scale of the economic shock, these alterations are relatively
limited. The essentials of IT have officially survived. It is true that the Bank of England is
claiming  a  focus  on  price  stability  whereas  it  seems  to  be  targeting  growth  and
employment. But supporting the Government’s objectives for growth and employment is
consistent with the Bank of England Act 1998, as long as this does not conflict with price
stability.  And  in  fact,  since  2013,  targeting  growth  and  employment  has  served  the
objective of price stability, because the monetary easing that the former requires has also
been needed to break the steady decelerating trend of inflation60.
36 The financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have therefore not completely disrupted the
British economic and political consensus in favour of the IT strategy. This raises again the
question of whether IT is not the end of monetary policy history61 – the final outcome of
centuries of thinking and tests, that will continue to be modified and improved, but that
will not disappear. The future will tell, but one may already wonder about what would
happen  if  a  situation  of  deep  stagflation  occurred  again  one  day  and  opposed  the
objectives of price stability on the one hand and growth and employment on the other. So
far, the resilience of the British IT framework does not seem to have been fully tested.
37 Nathalie Champroux, PhD, is associate professor at University Paris Est Créteil and
researcher at CERVEPAS/CREW EA 4399, Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3. One of her
two research subjects is British monetary policy since 1976.
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Figure 1: GDP growth, UK, 2003-2015
Source: Office for National Statistics
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Figure 2: Short-term interest rates, UK, 2003-2016
Source: Bank of England
 
Figure 3: Inflation, UK, 2003-2016
Source: Office for National Statistics
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ABSTRACTS
This article demonstrates the extent and limits of the consequences that the 2008 financial crisis
and the subsequent economic recession had on Britain’s monetary policy framework. It shows
that, beyond the activation of unconventional practices, the crisis caused a reform that was not a
complete overhaul of the framework. The bases of the framework dedicated to inflation targeting
have been maintained. The value of the reform nonetheless resides in the clarification of the
principles of the flexibility of the system and in a move towards a better coordination between
monetary and financial policies. The reform is thus embedded in the global progress of monetary
theories.
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L’article démontre l’étendue et les limites des conséquences que la crise financière de 2008 et la
récession économique qui a suivi ont eues sur le cadre de politique monétaire britannique. Il
montre que, au-delà de l’activation de pratiques non-conventionnelles, la crise a entraîné une
réforme qui n’a pas été une refonte totale du système. Les bases du cadre consacré au ciblage de
l’inflation ont  été  maintenues.  La valeur de la  réforme réside néanmoins dans le  fait  qu’elle
clarifie  les  principes  de la  flexibilité  du système et avance dans la  direction d’une meilleure
coordination  entre  les  politiques  monétaire  et  financière.  La  réforme  s’inscrit  ainsi  dans
l’évolution générale des théories monétaires.
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